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by Anthony Hurrell
The term "technical assistance" appears to have been used
first when the UN launched its technical assistance programme in
1948; at that tine it meant what it :Unplies - the use of the
technical expertise of the developed countries to help solve the
technical problems of countries not possessing this expertise.
Since 1948, however, the concept of technical assistance has been
greatly broadened to include the use of general operational
personnel, and education and training programmes which are non-
technioal except in the widest definition. Technical assistance
programmes have become manpower aid programmes intended to provide
or produce the human skills and lmowledge needed for development.
Thus the term "manpower aid" now seems to be more appropriate than
technical assistance.
One of the most striking features of the aid scene in the
1 960a was the sharp increase in expenditures on technical assistance,
at a tine when there was relatively little increase in total
official aid flows. Between 1962 and 1968 the total official
net disbursements of the DAC countries2 increased by only 16% while
total technical assistance expenditure increased by 9 (see Table I).
Thus, during these six years, the proportion of development
assistance given in the form of technical assistance increased
from 13.5 to 23.1%.
While the proportion of aid given in the form of technical
assistance was increased by all the major DAC donors, the increase
was particularly marked in the case of France and Germany; in
1968 nearly half of Irench official aid was technical assistance,
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compared with only a quarter in 1962. Despite only a saall
increase in total aid flows, the US continued to provide more
than two-fifths of all technical assistance, while the DX share
dropped from to under 7%.
Table I
Growth of Technical Assistance in 4 million
Source: Tables 3 aM 20, 0D 1969 Annual Aid Review
i0 Total net
official aid




1962 3271 976 421 400 467 5535



































1968 20 47 23 27 13 23.1
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Table II
Breakdown of expenditures on technical
1967assistance, million
* ny differences between the total and the sum of individual
figures is due to roimdjng,
Source: Table 23, 0D 1969 Axmual Aid Review
As Table II shows, the major item of expenditure on technica
assistance was the cost of experts but although this amounted to
4c of the total expenditure of all DAC donors, the proportion
varied from 6c% for the UK to 25% fer Germany. The German
expenditure on students and trainees was higher than that of any
other donor and amounted to 33% of the German programme compared
to only 5% for France. Four-fifths of all the expenditure on
volunteers and two-thirds of all the expenditure on equipment was
provided by the US,
There was also a good deal of variation in the pattern of
donors' fellowship and training programmes; the German programme
was biased towards training, while both the US and the UK
programme were biased towards fellowships. Moreover, the German
training programme was concentrated on industrial training, while
the British and French programmes were concentrated on non-
industrial training (. administration, education ..)
1. Students and
US France Germany UK Total DAC
trainees 37 22 43 17 151
2, xperts 203 168 31 55 528
3, Volunteers 108 2 6 3 126
4, Equipment 1Q2 13 32 3 155
5. Other and
unspecified 114 198 14 13 362
6, Total* 564 403 126 92 19322
Table III
Numbers of technical assistance
personnel working in developing countries in 1968
Source: OD, DAC Statistical Tables for the 1969 Annual Aid
Review
The two ex-colonial powers, Prance and the BK, provided most
of the operational personnel. This is in part because their
nationals were more readily acceptable in operational posts in
many of their ex-colonies than the nationals of other countries,
mainly because of the common administrative background.
Nearly two-thirds of all French technical assistance personnel
in 1967 were t eachers, and the number of French teachers was more
than a quarter of all technical assistance personnel provided by
all DAC countries. The US provided about three-quarters of all
the volunteers and more than half of the advisers.
These few facts and figures emphasise not only the rapid
growth of technical assistance in recent years, but also the
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Teachers 25,771 309 5,771 2,160 37,718
Administrators 3,504 8 379 188 4,345
Advisers 783 1,500 48 43 2,470
iii.Volunteers 492 17,396 1,787 2,005 25,555
Teachers 57 8,456 1,215 261 11,650
Others 435 8,940 572 1,744 13,905
iv. Advisers 5,101 9,896 489 873 18,992
V, TOTAL 42,613 29,109 18,352 5,986 109,007
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variations in the proportion of aid devoted to technical
assistance and in the composition of the programmes of the major
donors, Variations are partly due to the different historical
relationships of the various donors and the developing countries,
but these do not explain the nain difference. It might be
expected for example, that because of their special links the ex-
colonial powers might devote a much greater share of their aid to
technical assistance than the other donors, but while this is true
of France, it is not true of Britain0 Moreover, this does not
explain the significant differences in the proportion of technical
assistance devoted to fellowships, training, teachers, experts and
volunteers, or the differences in the composition of these parti-
cular programmes. If these differences were complementary for
the programmes within the recipient countries they would not be
so important; a country might then be able to obtain all the
different types of manpower aid that it required. In effect,
however, recipient countries are not offered much choice, other
than on a small scale, since each of the donor countries concen-
trates on certain ide's (usually former colonies or, in the US
case, Latin America and South East Asia) to the exclusion of
other donors,
THE PROVISION OF MANPOWER AID
Manpower aid can be conveniently divided into three main
categories:
Substitution for local skills when these are not available,
e.g. operational personnel;
Improvement of local skills, e.g. training programmes,
institution building;
Supplementation of local skills, e.g0 provision of advisers,
SUBSTITUTION FOR LOCAL SKILLS
Operational personnel other than volunteers
Of the 20,000 operational personnel (other than teachers and
volunteers) who were being financed by DAC aid programme in 1968,
nearly 10,000 British and nearly 7,000 were French. Similarly,
of the 37,700 teachers, who can also be regarded as operational
personnel, nearly 26,000 were French and nearly 6,000 were British,
The main fields in which these British operational personnel were
employed were Education, Works and Communication, Public Adinini-
stration, Agriculture and Health,1 Four-fifths were employed in
six African countries; Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (c. 4,700),
Zambia (cc. 3,250), Nigeria (co 1,300) and Malawi (870),
1 Table 16, British Aid Statistics (ODN 1969)
1 T. Hayter, French Aid (Overseas Development Institute, 1966).
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The provision of French operational personnel was also
largely a continuation of previous colonial links. The French
effort has been heavily concentrated in North Africa, particularly
Morocco, arid in the ax-French colonies of West Africa0
Teresa Hayter has pointed out1 that as half of French aid was spent
on technical assistance and as nearly half of this was spent on
salaries of French operational personnel, a large proportion of
French aid was spent on paying its on civil servants. It has
also been argued that one of the main reasons for France and
Britain providing this type of aid was to find continued employment
for large numbers of ex-colonial civil servants. While there may
have been some truth in this in the early 1960s it is becoming
less and less so.
Volunteers
In the early and mid-i 960s volunteers were increasingly used
as a form cf manpower aid for developing countries. By 1968 there
were just over 25,500 volunteers supported by official aid
programmes of DAC countries. Of these 21,200 (83%) came from
three countries - the US, the UK and Germany - but while the UK
and Germany provided only 1 ,800 and 2,000 respectively, the US
provided 17,400. Thus, while US provided practically no opera-
tional personnel other than volunteers, it ;rovided 7C of ail
volunteers, and these amounted to about 4C of all operational
personnel provided by DAC countries in 1 968. Volunteers were
more or less evenly divided among Africa, Asia and Latin America,
but the pattern of distribution has changed markedly over the
1960s as a result cf changes in the political relationships between
US and some of the recipient governments. More than half of the
Peace Corps is involved in education arid about a quarter in
community development projects. Two-thirds of British volunteers
were also employed in education, but German volunteers were mainly
engaged in crafts, industry and agriculturee
Localization policies and the future demand for operational
personnel
Most of the ex-colonies, and particularly the Anglophone
countries are following a deliberate policy of replacing foreign
operational personnel by their on nationals as quickly as possible.
Their plans give first priority to the localization of government
services, then to education and finally to the private sector,
Localization of central government services is now largely
completed in many countries, but even in these there will probably
continue to be a need for foreign operational personnel in some
of the more specialized posts for some years to come, The recent
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and massive education programmes should also lead to a rapid
reduction in the need for expatriate teachers in the nid-1 970's,
although the short-run effect of these programmes niay increase
rather than lessen the demand in the next year or two.
The natural desire for localization, the steps taken to
provide the skilled manpower required and the growing resentment
against the presence of foreign operational personnel in many
developing countries are therefore likely to reduce the demand for
operational manpower aid, particularly by the later-i 970's, when
many of these countries will have moved far towards self-sufficiency
in the supply of teachers. The peak of the volunteer movement
has probably already passed, and the emphasis in the 1970's will
be on quality rather than quantity: enthusiasm and idealism will
no longer suffice when the main demand will be for technical skills
and experience. On the recruitment aide salaries and conditions
of service originally designed to retain colonial civil servants
or to supply large numbers of operational personnel such as
teachers may not be particularly suited to new demands for highly
qualified personnel in certain specialized fields or in fields
such as industrial development which have been largely neglected
by many donors.
INPROVENT OF LOCAL SKILLS
Training
The success of localization will depend not only on formal
education programmes designed to increase the stock of educated
manpower, but increasingly on specially devised training
progra,nes designed -to provide the specialized vocational skills
and experience required.
Training in developed countries
At present, most of the manpower aid which is given to provide
fellowships and training is to provide such education and training
in the developed countries. In 1967 (the latest full figures
available) 85% of all students and trainees assisted by DAC
countries were being educated or trained in the donor country.
Proponents of such schemes believe that such programmes bring
significant political, economic and perhaps cultural advantages
to the donor in addition to the benefits to the recipient
countries, They also argue that the lack of local facilities
and local expertise as against the extensive and skilled resources
available in the developed countries fully justifies such
programmes which should be greatly expanded.
At the other extreme are those who argue that such programmes
are often of little real benefit to the developing countries and
that in some cases they nay do nore harm than good. They point
out that selection procedures are bad; that frequently the
study fellow or trainee cannot apply what he has learnt, and even
if he is well selected for an appropriate course, his presence
at home is more important than the training. Such critics also
point to the much higher cost of study and training overseas and
the danger that lavish provision of study and training oppor-
tunities abroad may inhibit the growth of indigenous institutions
and possibly contribute to the "brain drain".
The truth lies between these extremes. Surveys and evalua-
tion of training programmes abroad have shown that in general
they have been used reasonably and responsibly, have produced
remarkably little wastage and have been of considerable benefit
to the recipient country. Selection procedures of b oth reci-
pients and donors, however, can be greatly improved. Training
courses and fellowship programmes need to be better and continu-
ously evaluated to ensure that they are meeting the present needs
of the recipients and that they have not become stale or, because
of vested interests, been continued after their original need has
disappeared.
Training in the country of origin
In 1967, the numbers of students and trainees directly
financed by the major donors were: France 2,576, Germany 1 040,
US 146, UK nil. While it can be argued that such local costs
should normally be provided by the developing country, there is
a strong case for donors helping to provide the skilled manpower
needed to establish or support local training schemes. However,
apart from the staff needed in local training institutions, donors
could do much more to provide ad hoc teams particularly to train
trainers in fields such as organization and method, training and
staff inspection in the public service and in middle and lower
level industrial skills. One of the most important areas for
the improvement of local skills is to be found in the provision
of local institutions, either new or reconstituted, which are
spéoially designed or adapted to meet the manpower needs of
individual countries or a group of countries. Such aid is,
however, usually given on a rather haphazard basis with too little
evaluation of need, purpose or programme.
Thtrd cQuitry training and education
The U.S., France, and Germany finance substantial prograinnies
of third country training and education, mainly in developing
countries. The French programme is restricted to students, the
German programme to trainees (mainly industrial trainees) while
the US programme is divided between the two. Third country
training is particularly important when the training required is
neither available locally, nor in a developed country. This
normally applies only to certain specialized fields, e.g. tropical
agriculture. But even if the education and training are available
in a developed country, education or training in another devel-
oping country is often more reant, apart from other gains such
as lower costs and avoidance of cultural shock.
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For political reasons many developing count ries are reluctant
to accept third country training facilities, and there is also a
general reluctance to rely on neighbouring countries for training
facilities. There is a tendency by students and trainees to
regard training in a developing country as inferior to training
in a developed country, though this is often an excuse to conceal
a preference for travel. Despite these difficulties, all donors
and particularly multilateral donors, could do more to investigate
a greater use of manpower aid for third country training.
STJPPLEtNTATION OF LOCAL SKThLS
The use of foreign experts ai-id advisers
Between 1962 and 1 967 the number of experts and advisers(i.e. non-operational personnel) financed by OECD countries for
missions in developing countries increased from just over 6,000
to nearly 18,000 - a sharp increase notwithstanding some re-
classification or replacement of operational personnel. It is
no surprise that such an increase brought a decrease in quality.
Many expatriate experts and advisers undoubtedly know too little
about the country they are advising and many are often recruited
on a faute de mieux basis.
But it is easy to make the foreign expert the scapegoat for
the failure of his mission while in fact much of the blame might
rest with those who requested his services without really thinking
out why he was required, and with those responsible for recruiting
him arid preparing (or rather no preparing) him for his mission.
Too often a request for an expert is ai-i excuse to put off un-
palatable policy decisions, or the request for service is vague
and ill-defined, Some experts even find on arrival that theirjob is entirely different from what they were told on appointment,
or that it has already been done,
Many expert missions have failed however, not because of
the lack of appropriate professional expertise of the expert,
but because of personality defects. The relationship between
a foreign expert and the local administration is often a very
sensitive one, particularly if the local administrators feel that
the appointment of the expert is a reflection on their own
capacilities. Thus qualities such as tact, tolerance, adap-
tability, persistence and above all "understanding" (in the sense
of being able to see problems and suggest solutions through the
eyes of and with the intellectual and cultural attitudes of the
local people) are often as important or even more important than
professional skills. It is not easy for recruiting agencies to
assess those qualities, particularly if they are engaging experts
whom they have not previously employed. Nevertheless, they
should do all they can to obtain some outside objective assessments
of the personal qualities of applicants who are short-listed for
missions, since even one bad appointment can give rise to serious
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political difficulties, Careful job briefing and suitable
orientation courses can also do a great deal to prepare the expert
for his assignment.
Bad conditions of service, such as poor accommodation, may
lead to an expert terminating his mission prematurely; or even if
this does not happen, an expert may not be fully efficient because
of his preoccupation with such matters. A good deal more could
be done to standardize conditions of service for foreign experts -
a task for TINDP. Finally the use of experts and advisers would be
improved if more use was made of lessons learned from previous
assignments. Unfortunately, many donors or agencies do not
attempt to carry out any systematic evaluation of such aid. Often
experts are not even debriefed at the end of their missions.
NEED FOR IROVEMENT IN THE ORGANISATION OF MANPOWER AID
Recipients
One of the misconceptions about manpower aid is that because
it is usually grant-aided it costs little to the recipient. In
fact, the recipients are normally expected to provide a large
proportion of the direct costs (. loca], salaries1 housing,
office accommodation, transport, medical facilities). In addition,
there are a number of important indirect costs, such as the time
of local officials and counterparts. Finally, there are oppor-
tunity costs to be considered, involving not only alternative uses
of the recipient's scarce resources, but also alternative uses of
the aid resources. For these reasons, it is important for the
recipients to ensure that manpower aid is well planned and organ-
ized, if only to make certain that the resources involved are not
wasted because of inadequate preparation.
There are therefore strong arguments for encouraging recipient
countries to establish machinery for planning, organizing,
controlling and evaluating manpower aid. Perhaps one of the top
priorities for manpower aid should be to help in the establishment
of such machinery. Co-ordination of aid is often left to indi-
vidual ministries and departments to arrange for the manpower that
they require (or more usually are offered) in the particular fields
with which they are concerned. Although such delegation may be
good in that it allows more flexibility and faster action than
might be the case if the administration of all manpower aid were
centralized, in the long run such delegation probably leads to a
serious misallocation of scarce resources.
Bilateral Donors
Most bilateral donors tend to underadminister manpower aid
compared to capital aid. The nain reasons for this are the
diffuseness of manpower aid, its dispersion over a large number
of different agencies and the fact that each individual project
costs relatively little. Moreover, manpower aid tends to be
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much more complex than capital aid and it is much more difficult
for a general policy-maker to obtain the necessary background
and expertise required to plan and control a large programme than
it is to plan and control an equivalent amount of' capital aid.
As arasult different sections of manpower aid programmes often
expand or contract for reasons which are not related to the
manpower needs of the developing countries0 Although manpower aid
usually involves very heavy donor staff costs - for example, in
one large donor country, technical assistance absorbs about two-
thirds of the staff but costs about one-fifth of the total aid
programme1 - most of the staff involved are usually of low grade
concerned with routine operations such as the placing of trainees0
Aid organizations are, however, usually reluctant to take the
necessary steps to coordinate and rationalise their manpower aid
particularly when, as in many of the donor countries, such aid is
provided by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental
agencies. It is also often argued that, as an important feature
of manpower aid is to be able to respond quickly to a wide variety
of small ad hoc requests, this necessary speed and flexibility
would be lost if all such aid were subject to more centralized
planning.
Another of the problems which inhibit the improvement of
bilateral manpower aid is that the manpower aid relationship is
usually even more sensitive than other aid relationships. It is
often more difficult for a country to achnowledge a shortage of
skilled manpower than a shortage of capital. Moreover, capital
aid can be largely anonnnous and the negotiation of such aid
involves relatively few people. Manpower aid directly involves
hundreds of thousands, and the very presence of the foreign expert
usually enjoying a high standard of living, is a constant reminder
of' this donor-recipient relationship. Because the manpower aid
relationship is a particularly sensitive one, some donors, anxious
to avoid charges of neo-colonialism, have been much more reluctant
to take positive steps to plan and control manpower aid than they
have been to plan and control capital aid.
Multilateral Donors
There are many practical arguments for leaving the day-to-day
provision of manpower aid in the hands of the bilateral donors.
Bilateral agencies have direct access to the sources of recruitment
and the provision of most of the training in developed countries0
They can usually supply such aid much faster and more easily than
multilateral agencies. There is therefore little reason for
multilateral agencies to establish their own recruiting agencies
for manpower aid which merely compete with the bilateral organi-
zations for the same restricted source of supply (competition
which merely tends to increase Salar_es). The TJ1 and its agencies
1 Technical Assistance and the Needs of Developing Countries(oD, 1968), p. 30.
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should concentrate on fields of manpower aid for which the
bilateral donors either have no special advantage or have little
motivation to help. Examples are the provision of third country
training or regional and global projects such as the establishment
of regional training institutions and particularly those which link
up the aid concentration areas of individual donors and different
types of manpower aid.
However, although there are good arguments for leaving the
main supply of manpower aid on a bilateral basis this does not
mean that there should not be more multilateral planning of aid.
Ideally efficient coordination of manpower aid should be essen-
tially the responsibility of recipient governments, but few devel-
oping countries yet possess adequate planning and administrative
machinery to achieve this, Some developing countries might there-
fore welcome the establishment of consortia or consultative groups
on manpower aid in which the WDP could play the sane role as the
World Bank or the F' in consortia or consultative groups on
capital aid. It would be unrealistic to assume that donors would
be willing to allow such international meetings to determine the
exact shape and size of their bilateral manpower aid programmes,
but the main purpose of such machinery would be to hold high level
policy meetings about every two years to improve the supply of
information about a country's manpower needs, to assess past
manpower aid, to give details of existing commitments and, most
important of all, to establish priorities and guidelines for
future policy.
